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Factors relevant for the assessment of sufficient gravity in the ICC. 
Proceedings and the elements of international crimes 
 
Marco Longobardo* 
 
Non domandarci la formula che mondi possa aprirti.1 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The question of the assessment of ‘sufficient gravity’ for the purpose 
of cases and potential cases before the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has been increasingly debated over the last decade.2 The relevant 
ICC case law – which this paper will examine briefly – is not explicit as 
to which elements are relevant for this gravity assessment. Accordingly, 
an analysis of this issue is of practical relevance and has some theoretical 
allure since the gravity assessment may lead to the decision not to open 
an investigation or to consider inadmissible a case. The present paper 
suggests that only factors that are not elements of international crimes 
should be taken into consideration. In order to advance this argument, 
this paper examines the recent proceedings on Mavi Marmara, in which 
there was strong disagreement between the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) and the Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTCI) in regards to the gravity of 
the potential cases arising from that situation. 
* PhD, School of Law, University of Rome ‘Sapienza’; Adjunct Professor, School of 
Law, University of Messina. This paper was completed on 27 October 2016, when all 
the internet references were last accessed. Many thanks to Chiara Ragni and Emanuele 
Cimiotta for their comments to an earlier draft. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 E Montale, ‘Non chiederci la parola’ in Ossi di seppia (Piero Gobetti 1925). 
2 Generally on this topic see eg MM deGuzman, ‘Gravity and the Legitimacy of the 
International Criminal Court’ (2008) 32 Fordham Intl L J 1400; MM El Zeidy, ‘The 
Gravity Threshold under the Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 19 
Criminal L Forum 35; R Estupiñan Silva, ‘La “gravité” dans la jurisprudence de la Cour 
pénale internationale à propos des crimes de guerre’ (2011) 82 Revue internationale de 
droit pénal  541; WA Schabas, MM El Zeidy, ‘Article 17 – Issues of Admissibility’ in  O 
Triffterer, K Ambos (eds), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (3rd edn, CH Beck-Hart-Nomos 2016) 781. 
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2.  The Mavi Marmara affair before the ICC  
 
In 2010, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) boarded three vessels of 
the Gaza Aid Flotilla – the Mavi Marmara, the Eleftheri Mesogios, and 
the Rachael Corrie – killing nine passengers on board the Mavi Marmara 
and causing the subsequent death of another some days later.3 This in-
terception was not the first Israeli boarding of vessels trying to enforce 
the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip,4 and at that time it was diffi-
cult to predict any role for the ICC since the Court lacked jurisdiction 
over crimes allegedly committed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
– a situation that in part changed in 2015 when Palestine joined the ICC 
Statute and issued a declaration of acceptance of the ICC jurisdiction.5  
However, in 2013 the ICC jurisdiction in relation to the Mavi Mar-
mara boarding was triggered by a referral issued by the Comoro Islands 
(Comoros), a state party to the ICC Statute that was directly involved in 
3 The legality of the boarding received a great deal of attention by scholars. See eg 
A Sanger, ‘The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla’ (2010) 
13 Yb Intl Humanitarian L 397; A Annoni, ‘L’abbordaggio della Gaza Freedom Flotilla 
alla luce del diritto internazionale’ (2010) 94 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 1203; R 
Buchan, ‘The International Law of Naval Blockade and Israel’s Interception of the Mavi 
Marmara’ (2011) 58 Netherlands Intl L Rev 209; D Guilfoyle, ‘The Mavi Marmara 
Incident and Blockade in Armed Conflict’ (2011) 81 British YB Intl L 171. 
4 See eg the Dignity incident of 30 December 2008 (commented on by E 
Papastavridis, The Interception of Vessels on the High Seas: Contemporary Challenges to 
the Legal Order of the Oceans (Hart 2013) 94), and the Spirit of Humanity episode of 29 
June 2009 (on which see UNHRC, ‘Report of the international fact-finding mission to 
investigate violations of international law, including international humanitarian and 
human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying 
humanitarian assistance’ UN Doc  A/HRC/15/21 (27 September 2010) para 77). 
5 For the Palestinian accession, see UN Secretary-General, Depositary Notification: 
Rome Statute of the ICC, Palestine accession (6 January 2015) 
<www.treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.13.2015-Eng.pdf>. In addition, 
Palestine presented a declaration of its acceptance of ICC jurisdiction over the crimes 
committed during the 2014 Gaza war (Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Palestine declares 
acceptance of ICC jurisdiction since 13 June 2014’ (5 January 2015)) – a situation that is 
currently under the OTP’s scrutiny. On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the ICC, see 
generally, C Meloni, G Tognoni (eds), Is There A Court For Gaza? A Test Bench for 
International Justice (TMC Asser Press 2012); I Stegmiller, ‘Palästinas Aufnahme als 
“Mitgliedstaat” des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs’ (2015) 75 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öfentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 435; MM El Zeidy, ‘Ad hoc 
Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation under Scrutiny’ in 
C Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 
179. 
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the boarding since the Mavi Marmara was flagged as a Comoros vessel.6 
Accordingly, the OTP opened a preliminary examination into the Mavi 
Marmara boarding;7 this examination was terminated after two years 
with the OTP’s decision not to open an investigation due to an alleged 
lack of gravity of the situation at hand (hereinafter ‘Decision Not to In-
vestigate’).8 The Comoros challenged this conclusion before the PTCI,9 
which decided, by a majority, in favour of the Comoros and ordered the 
OTP to reconsider its findings pursuant to Article 53(3) ICC Statute 
(hereinafter ‘PTCI Decision’).10 Since the OTP’s appeal against this de-
cision11 was dismissed as inadmissible,12 the OTP is under an obligation 
to reconsider its gravity assessment – although it may reconfirm its orig-
inal position.13 
The Mavi Marmara affair offers a poignant opportunity to study the 
issue of the sufficient gravity test in situations and cases within the 
scope of the ICC Statute. This topic was the battleground for the OTP 
6 Union of the Comoros, ‘Referral of the Union of Comoros with respect to the 31 
May 2010 Israeli raid on the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza’ (14 May 2013). 
7 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘ICC Prosecutor receives referral by the authorities of 
the Union of the Comoros in relation to the events of May 2010 on the vessel Mavi 
Marmara’(14 May 2013). 
8 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, Article 53(1) Report’ ICC-01/13-6-AnxA (6 November 2014). 
9 Union of the Comoros, ‘Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the 
Comoros, The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
Application for Review pursuant to Article 53(3)(a) of the Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 
November 2014 not to initiate an investigation into the Situation’ ICC-01/13-3-Red (29 
January 2015). 
10 Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the 
Comoros, The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision 
on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
initiate an investigation’ ICC-01/13-34 (16 July 2015). 
11 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the 
Comoros, The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Notice of 
Appeal of “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”’ ICC-01/13-35 (27 July 2015).  
12 Appeals Chamber, ‘Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, 
The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, “Decision on the 
admissibility of the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision on the request of the 
Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an 
investigation”’ ICC-01/13-51 (6 November 2015).  
13 ibid, para 42. See also G Turone, ‘Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor’, in A 
Cassese, P Gaeta, JRWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (OUP 2002) 1137, at 1157. 
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and PTCI – which had extremely different views on the determination 
of the gravity threshold in the instant case, as will be further explored in 
the subsequent subsections. Moreover, this episode raised some debate 
about the relationship between the OTP and PTC, particularly in rela-
tion to the independence granted to the OPT by the ICC Statute.14 Fi-
nally, this is the first occasion in which the OTP and a PTC have had to 
deal with the gravity of crimes, allegedly committed on board a vessel or 
aircraft. 
However, a comprehensive study of all these complex legal issues is 
beyond the purview of this paper. The analysis herein focuses only on 
the factors that should be regarded and disregarded in the determina-
tion of sufficient gravity, on the basis of the OTP and PTCI’s findings 
regarding the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed during the Mavi 
Marmara boarding.15  
 
 
3.  Sufficient gravity in the law and practice of the ICC 
 
The assessment of sufficient gravity is a part of the test for the ad-
missibility of a case pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) ICC Statute, according 
to which, ‘the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
[…] (d) [t]he case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by 
the Court’. The gravity threshold was introduced following a proposal 
14 For different opinions on this issue, see KJ Heller, ‘The Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
Dangerous Comoros Review Decision’ (Opinio Juris, 17 July 2015) 
<www.opiniojuris.org/2015/07/17/the-pre-trial-chambers-problematic-comoros-review-
decision/>; M deGuzman, ‘What is the Gravity Threshold for an ICC Investigation? 
Lessons from the Pre-Trial Chamber Decision in the Comoros Situation’ (ASIL Insights 
11 August 2015) <www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/19/what-gravity-threshold-
icc-investigation-lessons-pre-trial-chamber>. According to an authoritative commenta-
tor, PTCI’s approach was consistent with the past Appeals Chamber’s case law on grav-
ity – which will be discussed in the subsequent subsections (WA Schabas, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 467). 
15 I discussed other issues regarding the threshold of sufficient gravity in the instant 
case – in light of the role of the treaty interpretive criteria, the differences between the 
gravity assessment at the preliminary examination stage and during an actual 
investigation, and the role of the spatial scope of the alleged crimes – in a companion 
article (M Longobardo, ‘Everything Is Relative, Even Gravity: Remarks on the 
Assessment of Gravity in ICC Preliminary Examinations, and the Mavi Marmara Affair’ 
(2016) 14 J Intl Criminal Justice 1011). 
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by Professor James Crawford at a meeting of the International Law 
Commission in May 1994. The underpinning idea was that an interna-
tional court should not waste its scarce resources on prosecuting minor 
offenders; with only the most serious offences deserving of an interna-
tional trial.16 This idea was discussed, endorsed and adopted in the text 
of Article 17(1)(d) at the Rome Conference.17 
The assessment of gravity is a cornerstone of the ICC system. An 
evaluation of sufficient gravity must be performed by the OTP during 
the preliminary examinations pursuant to Article 53(1)(b), and during 
the investigations as a condition to begin the actual prosecution pursu-
ant to Article 53(2)(b). Moreover, the Chambers may even evaluate the 
admissibility of a case solely on the basis of sufficient gravity.18  
It has been suggested that the gravity assessment plays two distinct 
roles, providing a basis for the ICC jurisdiction under the admissibility 
test, and guiding the OTP’s discretionary selection of situations and 
cases to prosecute.19 Indeed, the important role played by gravity in the 
OTP’s selection of cases and situations is uncontroversial;20 however, 
there is not any hint in the ICC Statute that the OTP may apply, as a 
matter of prosecutorial policy, a gravity threshold higher than that re-
quired for the admissibility of a (potential) case.21 
Despite the centrality of the gravity assessment, the ICC Statute 
does not provide a definition of gravity, nor does it contain any clue as 
16 See ILC, ‘Summary Record of the 2330th Meeting’ (1994) YB Intl L Commission 
vol I, 9. 
17 See Bureau Discussion Paper, art 15(1)(d) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53 (6 
July 1998); Bureau Discussion Paper, art 15(1)(d) UN Doc 
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59/Corr.1 (11 July 1998); Report of the Committee of the Whole, 
art 17[15](1)(d) ) UN Doc A/CONF.183/8 (17 July 1998). For more on the draft 
history of the gravity clause, see S SáCouto, K Clearly, ‘The Gravity Threshold of the 
International Criminal Court’ (2008) 23 American U Intl L Rev 807 at 817-823; 
deGuzman (n 2) 1416-1425.  
18 See arts 15(3), 19 and 53(3) ICC Statute.  
19 See deGuzman (n 2) 1405-1416. 
20 For an overview, see WA Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and Gravity’ in C 
Stahn, G Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 229. The same author argued that the OTP’s gravity 
assessment in the selection of situations and cases might be influenced by political 
pressures (see WA Schabas, ‘Victors’ Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International 
Criminal Court’ (2010) 47 The John Marshall L Rev  535). 
21 The OTP expressed this opinion in its Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on 
Case Selection and Prioritisation (15 September 2016) para 36. 
 
 
26 QIL 33 (2016), 21-41              ZOOM IN 
to when a case is of sufficient gravity. However, the ICC case law may 
provide some useful insights on the issue. 
In 2006, after some years during which gravity was not assessed by 
the OTP, the prosecution focused mainly on a quantitative analysis of 
the scale of the alleged crimes in order to evaluate whether the suffi-
cient gravity requisite was met,22 while the PTCI described the gravity 
test as threefold, requiring the large-scale commission of crimes within 
the Court’s jurisdiction and the social alarm caused in the international 
community,23 as well as the fact that the accused is or are the most sen-
ior leader(s) in a given situation under investigation.24 PTCI’s position 
was rejected by the Appeals Chamber, which held that such a formalis-
tic narrow focus on senior leaders’ responsibilities would hamper the 
effectiveness of the ICC’s action.25  
In more recent case law, the Pre-Trial Chambers developed a new 
twofold approach. On the one hand, the assessment of gravity has to 
take into account whether the accused are those who bear the greatest 
responsibility for the commission of the alleged crimes.26 At the same 
time, though, gravity must be evaluated on the basis of both qualitative 
22 See Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Response to Communications Received 
Concerning Iraq’ (9 February 2006) 9.  
23 Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Situation in the DRC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appli-
cation for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’ ICC-01/04-520-Anx2 (10 February 2006) para 
46. 
24 ibid paras 48-53. 
25 Appeals Chamber, ‘Situation in the DRC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58”’ ICC-01/04-169 (13 July 2006) paras 73-
76, and 82 (para 82 is also quoted in Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Situation in Darfur, Sudan, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir’ ICC-02/05-01/09-3 (4 March 2009) para 48, fn 51). For scholarly 
critical remarks on the seniority criterion, see R Murphy, ‘Gravity Issues and the 
International Criminal Court’ (2006) 17 Criminal L Forum 281, at 312; I Stegmiller, 
‘The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Back and Forth in Lubanga and 
Ntaganda’ (2009) 9 Intl Criminal L Rev 547. 
26 Pre-Trial Chamber II, ‘Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya‘ ICC-01/09-19 (31 March 2010) paras 59-60; Pre-
Trial Chamber III, ‘Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Corrigendum to 
“Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire”’ ICC-02/11-14-Corr (3 
October 2011) para 204. 
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and quantitative criteria regarding the alleged crimes.27 Accordingly, not 
only should the scale of the alleged crimes be examined, but also their 
nature, manner of commission, and impact.28 This list has been en-
dorsed by the OTP,29 and does not seem to be exhaustive; it is possible 
to identify other criteria that are relevant for the gravity assessment in 
certain circumstances as demonstrated by the Mavi Marmara affair it-
self. 
The Chambers appear to consider that Article 17(1)(d) of the ICC 
Statute should be interpreted in light of the rules on treaty interpreta-
tion embodied in the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.30 
However, some interpretive issues have arisen. For instance, the OTP 
and the Chambers appear to have adopted different approaches regard-
ing who are the most responsible for the commission of the alleged 
crimes:31 from a victim-oriented perspective, the most responsible are 
those who actually played the major role in the crime commission, while 
as a matter of prosecutorial policy they are those who had the power to 
27 PTC II Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 26) para 62; PTC III Situation in 
the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (n 26) para 203.  
28 Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges’ ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red (8 February 2010) para 31; PTC II Situation in 
the Republic of Kenya (n 26) para 188; Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Situation in Georgia, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation’ ICC-01/15-
12 (27 January 2016) para 51. 
29 See art 29(2) of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (entry into force: 
23 April 2009). See also Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations’ (November 2013) paras 9 and 71; OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection 
and Prioritisation (n 21) paras 37-41.  
30 See eg Situation in the DRC, ICC-01/04-520-Anx2 (n 23) para 43. On the 
interpretation of the ICC Statute, see generally L Grover, Interpreting Crimes in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (CUP 2014). The question whether the 
rules on treaty interpretation are appropriate for the interpretation of a criminal statute 
is beyond the purview of this paper; for an overview of this issue, see WA Schabas, 
‘Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, in LC Vorah et al (eds), Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer 
Law International 2003) 847; L Gradoni, ‘Regole di interpretazione difficili da 
interpretare e frammentazione del principio di integrazione sistemica’ (2010) 93 Rivista 
di Diritto Internazionale 809, at 814-816; LM Sadat, JM Jolly, ‘Seven Canons of ICC 
Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of Article 25’s Rorschach Blot’ (2014) 27 Leiden J 
Intl L 755. 
31 For an interesting review of the ICC practice on this issue, see M Ochi, ‘Gravity 
Threshold before the International Criminal Court: An Overview of the Court’s 
Practice’ 19 International Crimes Database (2016). 
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most influence the commission of the crimes – that is to say the highest 
echelons.32 In addition, as confirmed by the ICC case law, even if both 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 53 ICC Statute refers to Article 17(1)(d), 
the evaluation of sufficient gravity at the preliminary examinations stage 
is somewhat different since the OTP has to evaluate the gravity of po-
tential cases, rather than of actual cases.33 Moreover, the gravity assess-
ment relates to the entire case(s) or potential case(s) arising from a situ-
ation, rather than every individual crime or potential crime under scru-
tiny.34  
In the Mavi Marmara affair, both the OTP and the PTCI affirmed 
that they would rely on this more recent twofold test.35 Nonetheless, 
they had different views on the actual application of these criteria. For 
instance, the expression ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility for 
the alleged crimes’ was meant by the OTP as a reference to the early 
ICC’s seniority doctrine,36 while PTCI considered that criterion satisfied 
if the accused were the individuals most involved in the commission of 
the alleged crimes.37 However, the most striking point of disagreement 
between the two organs was about the concrete application of scale, na-
ture, manner of commission, and impact. The disagreement led PTCI to 
perform an extremely detailed scrutiny of the OTP’s assessment, which, 
in certain cases, does not appear to be supported by the Pre-Trial 
Chambers’ powers under Article 53(3)(a).38 
32 In support of a victim-oriented approach to this issue, see M O’Brien, 
‘Prosecutorial Discretion as an Obstacle to Prosecution of United Nations Peacekeepers 
by the International Criminal Court: The Big Fish/Small Fish Debate and the Gravity 
Threshold’ 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 525. 
33 See PTC II Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19 (n 26) paras 58-60; 
PTC I Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12 (n 28) para 37.  
34 See Defence for General Mohammed Hussein Ali, ‘Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Prosecution’s Failure to 
Meet the Requirements of Article 54’ ICC-01/09-02/11 (19 September 2011) para 58. 
See also deGuzman (n 2) 1451. 
35 OTP Decision Not to Investigate (n 8) paras 135-136; PTC I Decision (n 10) para 
21. 
36 See Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the 
Comoros, The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
Prosecution Response to the Application for Review of its Determination under Article 
53(1)(b) of the Rome Statute’ ICC-01/13-14-Red (30 March 2015) para 62. 
37 PTC I Decision (n 10) paras 23-24. 
38 For an interesting analysis of the PTCI’s powers in relation to the OPT’s 
determination under art 53 ICC Statute, in light of the Mavi Marmara litigation, see GA 
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However, it is useful to analyse which factors are relevant for the 
gravity assessment and, then, to examine their actual application in the 
Mavi Marmara affair. 
 
 
4.  Gravity as an additional feature of cases and potential cases 
 
In certain paragraphs of the OTP’s and PTCI’s reasoning about 
gravity, the two ICC organs appear to have erred in the determination 
of what is relevant for the gravity assessment. 
Every crime embodied in the ICC Statute is a source of utmost con-
cern for the international community and, thus, inherently of high gravi-
ty. Accordingly, prima facie, as soon as there is a reasonable basis to be-
lieve that a crime embodied in the ICC Statute has been committed, the 
gravity threshold should be considered satisfied. However, this conclu-
sion would render the provision enlisting sufficient gravity as an admis-
sibility criterion useless. Accordingly, the PTCI’s opinion that ‘the rele-
vant conduct must present particular features which render it especially 
grave’39 is fully convincing on this point. In other words, ‘article 17 (1) 
of the Statute is in addition to the gravity-driven selection of the crimes 
included within the material jurisdiction of the Court’40 and ‘Article 17 
imposes a threshold requirement above and beyond the jurisdictional 
requirements of the Statute.’41  
These last statements are quite important since they clarify that 
gravity is an additional feature, and not a constituent element of the 
crime punishable under the ICC Statute: in other words, gravity is a fea-
ture of a case (actual or potential) based on those crimes. Accordingly, 
the elements of the crimes are unsuitable for evaluation in the gravity 
assessment since all conduct that constitutes an international crime has 
an inherent degree of gravity that is not relevant per se for the admissi-
bility of a case. 
Knoops, T Zwart, ‘The Flotilla Case before the ICC: The Need to Do Justice while 
Keeping the Heaven Intact’ 15 Intl Criminal L Review (2015) 1069, at 1073-1081.  
39 PTC I Situation in the DRC (n 23) para 465 (emphasis added). 
40 ibid (emphasis added). 
41 Defence for General Mohammed Hussein Ali Situation in the Republic of Kenya 
(n 34) para 56. 
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To this end, it is worth mentioning the elements of international 
crimes: they are the actus reus, that is the action or omission that consti-
tutes the behavioural components of every crime, and the mens rea, that 
is the criminal intent at the basis of a criminal act.42 Moreover, it is not 
sufficient that an actus reus is committed with the relevant psychological 
element in order to punish conduct as a crime; rather, one has to con-
sider whether the conduct is not in fact unlawful because some relevant 
defence excuses the act from being a crime. Some of these defences are 
labelled as justifications and are related to the existence of the crime it-
self, as the presence of the justification makes the actus reus lawful.43 
It is submitted here that the actus reus itself, the required mens rea 
for a specific crime, and the absence of a justification are not relevant 
for the gravity assessment, since they are not ‘particular features’ of a 
crime, but, rather, its basic components.44 Accordingly, gravity must be 
assessed on the basis of objective factors that are external or additional 
to the alleged crimes. 
It should be noted that, from this perspective, the OTP and the 
Chambers appear to consider the gravity assessment as a factual issue – 
since both organs conduct a detailed review of the situations under 
scrutiny. Accordingly, based on the relevant case law, a (potential) case 
meets the sufficient gravity threshold only when the alleged crimes are 
committed under such circumstances that make the conduct worthy of 
international prosecution; therefore, sufficient gravity is assessed on the 
existence of such circumstances that should be addressed by the OTP 
in the context of its prosecutorial activities.  
An overview of the ICC case law and practice regarding this factual 
approach supports the assertion that the gravity assessment is based on 
factual circumstances surrounding the allegedly criminal conduct. 
42 The literature on the components of international crimes is particularly vast. For 
a general introduction, see GA Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of International 
Criminal Tribunals: A Comparative Study (2nd edn, Brill 2016) 94-98. For a more 
comprehensive study, see I Marchuk, The Fundamental Concept of Crime in 
International Criminal Law: A Comparative Law Analysis (Springer 2014). 
43 See S Darcy, ‘Defences to International Crimes’ in WA Schabas, N Bernaz (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (Routledge 2011) 231. 
44 Accordingly, I do not share the view that the mens rea is relevant for the gravity 
assessment (as suggested eg by deGuzman (n 2) 1455-1456). 
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First, in 2006 PTCI suggested that ‘the relevant conduct must pre-
sent particular features which render it especially grave’45 – suggesting 
that other material elements in addition to the elements of crimes 
should be assessed. Accordingly, the Chambers, in their case law, have 
examined some factual elements additional to the elements of crimes as 
relevant for the gravity assessments. They include: the impact of the al-
leged crimes on the international community, such as the suspension 
and reduction of an international peacekeeping operation as conse-
quence of the alleged crimes;46 the number of victims;47 the inherent 
brutality of the means of commission of the crimes (eg the uses of poi-
sonous arrows and machetes, amputations, and so on);48 and the subse-
quent impact on victims of sexual crimes (such as the contraction of 
HIV/AIDS and social stigma).49 
Second, the most recent case law emphasises that the factors listed 
in rule 145(1)(c) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which 
regulates the determination of the sentence,50 may be relevant in the 
gravity assessment. Interestingly, PTCI did not refer to the entire text of 
rule 145(1)(c) as relevant for the admissibility of a (potential) case, but 
rather, only to those factors that are external to the elements of the 
crimes, ie, ‘the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm 
caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful  be-
haviour and the means employed to execute the crime.’51 It is telling 
45 PTC I Situation in the DRC (n 23) para 46 (emphasis added). 
46 PTC I Situation in Darfur, Sudan (n 28) para 33; PTC I Situation in Georgia (n 
28) para 55. 
47 PTC II Situation in the Republic of Kenya(n 26) paras 190-191; PTC I Situation 
in Georgia (n 28) para 54. 
48 PTC II Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 26) paras 192-193. See also PTC I 
Situation in Georgia(n 28) para 54 (with a brief reference to ‘expulsion of civilians […] 
sought by brutal means’). 
49 PTC II Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 26) paras 194-196. 
50 See ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Official Records of the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, 
New York ICC-ASP/1/3and Corr.1, part II.A (3-10 September 2002). On the issue of 
the role of gravity in the determination of the sentence – a topic outside the purview of 
this paper – see K Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol II: The Crimes 
and Sentencing (OUP 2014) 292-298. 
51 See eg PTC I Situation in Darfur, Sudan, (n 28) para 32. See also PTC II 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 26) para 62, where rule 145(1)(c) is not quoted, 
but rather summarized as comprising scale, nature, means of executions, impact. See 
also Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision on the 
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that other factors enlisted in rule 145(1)(c) that directly concerns the 
actus reus or the mens rea are deliberately not quoted by PTCI – con-
firming the idea that they are not relevant for the gravity assessment.52 
Similarly, some authors have argued that factors enlisted in rule 
124(2)(b)(iv) – ie the ‘[c]ommission of the crime with particular cruelty 
or where there were multiple victims’ – should be taken into account in 
the gravity assessment;53 again, they are not elements of the crimes, but 
rather additional factors. 
Third, the OTP’s practice focuses on the same external factors. The 
first time the OTP dealt with sufficient gravity, the office analysed the 
number of victims in comparison to other situations under its scrutiny.54 
In more recent examinations and investigations, the OTP based its 
gravity assessment on the number of victims,55 the cruelty of the manner 
of commission,56 the discriminatory intent,57 and the impact of the al-
leged crimes on the victims and on the international community as 
well.58 
Fourth, a similar fact-based analysis regarding the factors relevant 
for the gravity assessment is confirmed by the case law of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well. In 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute’ ICC-
01/09-02/11-382-Red (23 January 2012) para 50 (where rule 145(1)(c) is only 
mentioned).  
52 Other factors listed in rule 145(1)(c) that are not quoted by the Chambers are 
‘the degree of  participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the 
circumstances  of manner, time and location; and the age, education, social and 
economic  condition of the convicted person’. 
53 See Schabas, El Zeidy (n 2) 815.  
54 See OTP Response to Communications (n 22) 9-10. 
55 See eg Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15’ ICC-01/09-3 (26 November 
2009) para 56; Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 
Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15’ ICC-02/11-3 (23 
June 2011) para 58; Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation in Georgia, Corrected Version 
of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”’ ICC-01/15-4-
Corr (16 October 2015) para 330. 
56 OTP Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 55) para 58; OTP Situation in the Re-
public of Côte d’Ivoire (n 55) para 58; OTP Situation in Georgia (n 55) para 331. 
57 OTP Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 55) para 57; OTP Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (n 55) para 58; OTP Situation in Georgia (n 55) para 331. 
58 OTP Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 55) para 59; OTP Situation in 
Georgia (n 55) paras 332-336.  
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that context, the determination of the gravity of the cases was required 
in order to allow the ICTY to refer the prosecution of less grave crimes 
to national jurisdictions pursuant to rule 11bis of the ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.59 Notably, the ICTY case law assessed the 
gravity of those crimes on the basis of factors that are not elements of 
the crimes, and in particular on the basis of their scale, time period, and 
geographical scope.60 Although the ICC Appeals Chamber affirmed that 
the gravity test developed by the ICTY is too strict to be applicable to 
the ICC Statute due to the different context of the two regimes,61 the 
ICTY’s reference to factors additional to the elements of crimes should 
be taken into proper account in the selection of factors relevant for the 
gravity assessment.62 
This approach to the factors relevant for the gravity assessment is in 
part confirmed by the OTP’s and PTCI’s evaluations of gravity in rela-
tion to the Mavi Marmara boarding. 
 
4.1. The OTP’s evaluation of gravity in the Mavi Marmara affair 
 
In the Decision Not to Investigate, the OTP adopted a mixed ap-
proach. In general, it tried to consider external factors relevant for the 
gravity assessment, but in certain circumstances it referred to the com-
ponents of the alleged crimes committed during the boarding. 
First, the rank of the possible perpetrators – considered relevant by 
the OTP – is not a component of the alleged crimes and, accordingly, it 
is an element suitable to be considered in the assessment of gravity.63 
However, as mentioned previously, the OTP and PTCI had different 
59 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev 39 (22 September 2006) Rule 
11bis(c): ‘In determining whether to refer the case […] the Referral Bench shall, in 
accordance with Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), consider the gravity of the 
crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the accused.’ 
60 See eg ICTY, ‘Decision for referral to the authorities of the Republic of Croatia 
pursuant to rule 11 bis, Referral Bench’ IT-04-78-PT (14 September 2005) para 28; 
‘Decision on referral of case under rule 11 bis, Referral Bench’ IT-96-23/2-PT (17 May 
2005) para 19.  
61 See AC Situation in the DRC (n 25) para 80. 
62 On the ICTY’s case law regarding gravity and its relevance for the gravity 
assessment under the ICC Statute, see O’Brien (n 32) 540-542. 
63 OTP Decision Not to Investigate (n 8) para 135. 
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views on the correct way to identify the individual(s) most responsible 
for the commission of the alleged crimes. 
Second, the OTP was correct in considering that the existence of a 
plan or policy as well as the large-scale commission of war crimes pur-
suant to Article 8(1) ICC Statute are not elements of war crimes.64 Ac-
cordingly, the existence of a plan or policy as well as the large scale 
commission of war crimes are external factors suitable to form part of 
the gravity assessment. However, the OTP went too far when it af-
firmed that in war crimes ‘a specific gravity threshold’ exists.65 This 
statement, if isolated from the rest of the OTP’s reasoning, is simply in-
correct. The words ‘in particular’ in Article 8(1) ICC Statute were 
adopted in order to offer guidance to the OTP regarding the situations 
and cases it had to prioritise, and not to create an additional threshold.66 
It is not by chance that the US proposal to limit the ICC jurisdiction on 
war crimes only in cases of a plan/policy or large-scale commission was 
rejected during the preparatory works.67 However, one has to concede 
that the OTP in dealing with the gravity assessment has not applied its 
own unfortunate statement regarding a ‘specific gravity threshold’ for 
war crimes; moreover, its position on the issue was subsequently re-
phrased in a more appropriate way.68 
Third, the OTP correctly addressed the scale of the alleged crimes 
as an external factor. Similarly, with regard to the manner of commis-
sion, the OTP correctly focused on external features – such as the de-
gree of force employed by the IDF, the existence of a plan or policy, as 
well as the systematic character of the alleged crimes.69 The OTP’s anal-
ysis of the manner of the commission of the crimes was severely criti-
64 ibid para 137. 
65 ibid. 
66 AC Situation in the DRC (n 25) para 70. 
67 See M Cottier, ‘Article 8 Para 1: Jurisdiction in Respect of War Crimes’ in O 
Triffterer and K Ambos (n 30) 321,  at 321-322. 
68 See Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the 
Comoros, The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Public 
Redacted Version of Prosecution’s Consolidated Response to the Observations of the 
Victims’ ICC-01/13-29-Red (14 July 2015) para 100: ‘The Report also noted the 
chapeau to article 8(1) of the Statute which, in a somewhat different context, indicates 
that information suggesting crimes were committed pursuant to a plan or policy may 
significantly contribute to showing they are sufficiently grave to be investigated and 
prosecuted before this Court.’ See also paras 101-104. 
69 OTP Decision Not to Investigate (n 8) para 140. 
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cised by PTCI;70 however, the OPT correctly addressed the need to fo-
cus not on the actus reus but, rather, on additional relevant factors.  
Fourth, with regard to the impact of the alleged crimes, the OTP 
considered both the immediate impact on the victims and on the hu-
manitarian situation of the Gaza Strip.71 The impact of the alleged  
crimes on the living conditions in the Gaza Strip is not a component of 
those same crimes, and thus it is suitable for consideration in the gravity 
assessment.72 According to the OTP, since Israel made offers to allow 
the delivery of the humanitarian supplies on board the Mavi Marmara to 
the Gaza Strip before the boarding, and as those supplies were later dis-
tributed in the Gaza Strip, there is no room to argue that the boarding 
had a relevant impact on the population of the Gaza Strip.73 This state-
ment is open to criticism – especially since it is not clear why the living 
conditions in the Gaza Strip are not relevant in the assessment of the 
scale of the alleged crimes – since the area was outside the ICC jurisdic-
tion –,74 but at the same time they could be included in the assessment 
of the impact of the crimes. Perhaps the OTP was correct to distinguish 
so finely between the locus commissi delicti and the spatial dimension of 
subsequent prospective consequences of some crimes; however, the 
OTP should have better clarified its reasoning on this point.  
Finally, the OTP correctly addressed a further external factor as rel-
evant to the gravity assessment. The OTP mentioned that very small-
scale episodes might cross the gravity threshold as long as the crimes al-
legedly committed are ‘violent crimes of exceptionally serious gravity 
which have serious consequences not only for the victims, but also for 
the international community’.75 As an example, the OTP mentioned the 
Abu Garda case, in which an isolated attack against peacekeepers that 
resulted in a smaller number of victims was considered of sufficient 
gravity nonetheless – even in light of the subsequent reduction of the 
70 PTC I Decision (n 10) paras 31-45. 
71 OTP Decision Not to Investigate (n 8) para 141. 
72 See OTP Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The 
Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia(n 36) para 56.  
73 OTP Decision Not to Investigate (n 8) para 141. 
74 ibid para 147.  
75 ibid para 145. 
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African Union Mission in Sudan deployed therein.76 This conclusion re-
affirms the need to find factors relevant for the assessment of gravity 
outside the components of the alleged crimes.77 
However, in contrast, the OTP dealt very inaccurately with the na-
ture of the alleged crimes. Paragraph 139 of the OTP’s Decision Not to 
Investigate does not provide any useful clues regarding the nature of 
those crimes. According to the OTP: 
 
‘Nature: there is a reasonable basis to believe that the following war 
crimes have been committed: wilful killing and wilfully causing serious 
injury to body and health under article 8(2)(a)(i) and article 8(2)(a)(iii) 
– both of which are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions – as 
well as the war crime of committing outrages upon personal dignity 
under article 8(2)(b)(xxi). With respect to this latter crime, the 
available information suggests that following the takeover of the Mavi 
Marmara, there was mistreatment and harassment of passengers by the 
IDF forces and that such humiliating or degrading treatment lacked 
justification or explanation. It is noted, however, that the information 
available does not indicate that the treatment inflicted on the affected 
passengers amounted to torture or inhuman treatment.’78 
 
This paragraph says nothing on the nature of the war crimes alleged-
ly committed by the IDF during the interception of the Mavi Marmara. 
Rather, the OTP merely lists the crimes that it considers likely to have 
76 ibid. See also OTP Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, 
The Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia (n 36) para 72; PTC I 
Situation in Georgia (n 28) para 55. 
77 However, the OTP was perhaps less persuasive when it concluded that the ‘al-
leged crimes committed during the flotilla incident are of a different nature and do not 
have a corresponding qualitative impact’ since, in the OTP’s opinion, the main goals of 
the Mavi Marmara were political objectives, rather than humanitarian (see M Kearney, 
‘Initial Thoughts on the ICC Prosecutor’s Mavi Marmara Report’ (Opinio Juris, 8 No-
vember 2013) opiniojuris.org/2014/11/08/guest-post-initial-thoughts-icc-prosecutors-
mavi-marmara-report/). Even less convincing is the emphasis the OTP put on the lack 
of neutrality and impartiality of the action of the convoy comprising the Mavi Marmara 
since peacekeeping operations – directly compared to humanitarian action for the as-
sessment of gravity by the OTP – are today losing their neutral / impartial character and 
are in fact sometimes involved as parties to armed conflicts (for more on this, see gener-
ally J Karlsrud, ‘The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement 
Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’ 36 
Third World Quarterly (2015) 40).  
78 OTP Decision Not to Investigate (n 8) para 139. 
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occurred during the boarding, providing a specific qualification (out-
rages upon personal dignity rather than torture). In other words, the 
OTP simply discussed here the qualification of the actus rei (outrages 
rather than torture), without any word as to why such conduct was or 
was not of sufficient gravity to deserve or not deserve an investigation. 
The analysis of the nature of the alleged crimes for the gravity assess-
ment should not be limited to the legal qualification of the conduct 
since both torture and outrages are listed as crimes in the ICC Statute 
(and, accordingly, they are inherently grave enough to fall into the ma-
terial scope of the Statute). Rather, the OTP should have explained why 
the potential case arising from that situation had that quid pluris of bru-
tality and cruelty that makes these actions worthy of an examination 
while many other (potential) cases would be inadmissible – even if they 
are based on acts that fall in abstracto into the description of interna-
tional crimes embodied in the ICC Statute. According to the preparato-
ry works of the ICC Statute, the nature of crimes with respect to their 
gravity relates to the specific character of those acts79 – a conclusion 
confirmed by some aforementioned decisions of the Pre-Trial Cham-
bers.80 In contrast, in the quoted paragraph of the Decision Not to In-
vestigate on the nature of the alleged crimes there is no assessment of 
additional or external features of the crimes – thus the analysis lacks 
rigour as to the gravity assessment.81 
 
 4.2. The PTCI’s approach to gravity in the Mavi Marmara litigation 
 
In reviewing the OPT’s Decision not to Investigate, the PTCI main-
ly examined factors that are not components of the alleged crimes in 
order to address the gravity issue. However, the PTCI’s analysis regard-
79 See ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 
Thirty-ninth Session’ (4 May-17 July 1987) UN Doc A/42/10 (1987) para 66, art 1(2): 
‘Seriousness can be deduced either by the nature of the act in question (cruelty, 
monstrousness, barbarity, etc.)’. 
80 See above section 4. 
81 The problem of the qualification of those acts as torture or outrages upon 
personal dignity was at the centre of a debate between the PTCI and the OTP, with the 
former considering the latter was mislead by this qualification in the assessment of 
sufficient gravity (PTC I Decision (n 10) para 30). For more on this, see Longobardo (n 
15) 1020.   
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ing the nature of the crimes focused on the qualification of the crimes, 
and the overall reasoning does not appear entirely convincing.  
First, the PTCI focused on the fact that an investigation may regard 
those who bear the greatest responsibility in the commission of the al-
leged crimes as an additional factor to the components of the alleged 
crimes, and thus suitable to be employed in the determination of suffi-
cient gravity.82 
Second, the PTCI rightly took into consideration other factors that 
are not components of the alleged crimes, such as the use of live fire 
under the analysis of the manner of commission,83 and the impact of the 
alleged crimes both on the immediate and beyond.84 
Third, and more interestingly, the PTCI also referred to another 
factor, namely the impact that the alleged crimes had on the interna-
tional community, supposedly confirmed by the creation of several fact-
finding commissions.85 This point deserves attention since it may reso-
nate with the aforementioned ICC case law regarding the impact on the 
international community of crimes against peacekeepers. However, the 
PTCI went further, and clearly affirmed that: 
 
‘As a final note, the Chamber cannot overlook the discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, the Prosecutor’s conclusion that the 
identified crimes were so evidently not grave enough to justify action 
by the Court, of which the raison d’être is to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes of concern to the international community, and, 
on the other hand, the attention and concern that these events 
attracted from the parties involved, also leading to several fact-finding 
efforts on behalf of States and the United Nations in order to shed 
light on the events. The Chamber is confident that, when 
reconsidering her decision, the Prosecutor will fully uphold her 
mandate under the Statute.’86 
  
82 PTC I Decision (n 10) paras 22-24. 
83 ibid paras 33-36. 
84 ibid paras 47-48. 
85 ibid para 48. However, the overall international community’s reaction was rather 
limited, with no condemnation from the Security Council through a resolution. For 
more on this, see M Longobardo, ‘Some Developments in the Prosecution of 
International Crimes Committed in Palestine: Any Real News?’ (2015) 35 Polish Yb Intl 
L 109, 130 and 133. 
86 PTC I Decision (n 10) para 51. 
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This paragraph met strong criticism since it appeared to be based 
on the doctrine of social alarm, which was considered irrelevant to the 
determination of gravity in the previous case law of the ICC Appeals 
Chamber.87 In particular, this approach would politicise the ICC’s ac-
tions, since ‘just as crimes the world obsesses over might be insufficient-
ly grave to warrant investigation, crimes the world ignores could be 
more than grave enough.’88 These concerns are worthy of attention. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, it should be acknowledged 
that PTCI identified an additional factor to the components of the al-
leged crimes for the assessment of gravity – even if the social alarm test 
is not based on an objective factor, rather on an highly subjective one 
that therefore should not be considered relevant in the gravity assess-
ment.89 
In contrast and in accordance with the OTP’s position in the Deci-
sion Not to Investigate, the PTCI took into account as relevant for the 
examination of the nature of the crimes their qualification, which is 
based on the components of the alleged crimes, rather than on addi-
tional factors. According to the PTCI: 
 
[T]he Prosecutor’s conclusion that the unjustified mistreatment and 
harassment of passengers by the IDF forces did not amount to the war 
crime of torture or inhuman treatment [...] is not just a matter of 
article 53(1)(a) of the Statute (i.e. of whether there is a reasonable basis 
to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
committed). Rather, this is a matter that is equally relevant to the 
evaluation of the gravity of the potential case(s) [...] as the concept of 
nature of the crimes (which is indeed a relevant factor in the 
determination of the overall gravity), revolves around the relative 
gravity of the possible legal qualifications of the apparent facts, i.e. the 
crimes that are being or could be prosecuted.90 
 
87 AC Situation in the DRC (n 25) para 72. 
88 KJ Heller, ‘The Most Distressing Paragraph in the Comoros Review Decision’ 
(Opinio Juris, 19 July 2015) http://opiniojuris.org/2015/07/19/the-most-distressing-
paragraph-in-the-comoros-review-decision/. 
89 According to the Appeals Chamber, ‘the criterion of “social alarm” depends 
upon subjective and contingent reactions to crimes rather than upon their objective 
gravity’ (AC Situation in the DRC (n 25) para 72). 
90 PTC I Decision (n 10) para 28. 
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This paragraph of the PTCI Decision is quite unconvincing for at 
least two reasons. First, the PTCI’s reasoning in regards to an assess-
ment of the ‘overall gravity’ as the sum of the ‘relative gravity’ of each 
crime does not appear sound; simply put, this test risks shifting the en-
tire gravity assessment from the (potential) case(s) to each specific al-
leged crime – hereby contradicting the aforementioned ICC case law91 
and would be extremely premature at the preliminary examinations 
stage. Second, PTCI considered that outrage upon personal dignity is a 
crime of an inherently less grave nature than torture, thus envisaging a 
hierarchy among war crimes that is not based on the ICC Statute. The 
fact that both outrage and torture are considered to be of a sufficient 
gravity to be punished in the ICC Statute should have barred PTCI 
from suggesting such a novel hierarchy. In contrast, considering gravity 
as an additional element to the components of the alleged crimes – ex-
ternal to the actus reus, in the instant case – would have helped PTCI to 
avoid this unconvincing conclusion. In the opinion of the present writ-
er, the nature of the alleged crime(s) – relevant for the gravity assess-
ment – must be disentangled by the legal qualification of the material 
facts under scrutiny, ie the fact that they likely were outrages upon per-
sonal dignity rather than torture should not be relevant for the gravity 
assessment. Legal qualifications are irrelevant for the gravity assessment 
as long as the conduct is punished by the ICC Statute; rather, the gravi-
ty assessment is based on external factors, so that acts that may be la-
belled the same may be of a very different gravity. By way of concrete 
example, arguably the war crime of wilful killing pursuant to Article 
8(2)(a)(i) or Article (2)(c)(i) ICC Statute is inherently of a more grave 
nature if a civilian is thrown from a building for being gay92 rather than 
if that same civilian were to be shot in the forehead during a military 
operation – even if the legal qualification of the crime is the same in 
both cases.93 In the instant example, one could consider the motivation 
91 See above (n 34). 
92 The example is taken by ISIS’s practice of  killing civilians accused of being 
homosexual. See eg  A Cowborn, ‘Isis Has Killed at Least 25 Men in Syria Suspected of 
Being Gay, Group Claims’ The Independent, 5 January 2016, 
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-has-killed-at-least-25-men-in-
syria-suspected-of-being-gay-group-claims-a6797636.html. 
93 This allegation regarding the killing of one of the Mavi Marmara passengers is 
reported by the Decision Not to Investigate (n 8) para 59. 
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of the first crime (the hatred against a minority) relevant for the assess-
ment of gravity under the nature of the crime umbrella, while the bar-
baric method of execution is relevant under the manner of commis-
sion’s label. Such an approach would be more in line with the afore-
mentioned scant words of the preparatory works regarding the nature 
of crimes,94 and it would also have the effect of avoiding the creation of 
a hierarchy among different war crimes. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
 
From an examination of the ICC case law and the OTP’s practice 
regarding admissibility pursuant to sufficient gravity, it is clear that 
there is no well-established practice on the topic. It is possible that the 
recent Mavi Marmara affair will lead to a jurisprudential determination 
of sufficient gravity, hopefully by the Appeals Chamber. Such an out-
come would be extremely welcome since it would reduce uncertainty 
on this point in the future. 
This paper suggests that only objective factors that are external or 
additional to the elements of the crimes may be relevant in the gravity 
assessment. Although there is no clear jurisprudential dictum on this 
point, the ICC case law and the OTP’s practice, Mavi Marmara litiga-
tion included, in part reflect this approach – with the notable exception 
of the consideration of the nature of the alleged crimes that is still erro-
neously linked to the qualification of the actus rei under scrutiny. How-
ever, the suggested approach could prove useful in the future in order 
to narrow and clarify the list of factors that should be assessed, hereby 
strengthening the credibility of ICC action and the certainty of the law 
in this field.    
 
94 See above (n 79). 
 
 
